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BACK TO BASICS: WITHOUT DISTINCTION - A DEFINING PRINCIPLE? 
Alison Stuart 
1. Introduction 
The duty placed upon states to ensure human rights without distinction is the starting 
point from which modern human rights law sprang. This fundamental duty was first 
encapsulated within the UN Charter1 and has been given weight and reiterated in 
every human rights treaty since. It is the foundation upon which the wider concept of 
non discrimination and equality has been built, and is currently recognised as a 
fundamental norm of international law2. One might, therefore, have assumed, from 
the primacy given to the duty within the UN Charter and subsequent international 
human rights treaties that the non distinction norm would have had a prominent role 
to play in the normative development of the content of each human right. Strangely, 
this has not been the case. The importance and primacy rightly given to the non 
distinction norm within the UN Charter has been eroded by the norm's later 
conceptualisation in international human rights jurisprudence.  
Judicial bodies, rather than treating the non distinction norm as integral to, and part 
of, each human right, have separated the duty not to discriminate, in the fulfilment of 
each human right, from the development of the scope of that human right. In effect, 
they have developed each human right independently of the duty to ensure them 
without distinction and treated the non distinction norm as a substantive human right 
to be balanced alongside any other human right3. The practical effect of this judicial 
approach has been to import limitations into the fundamental norm of non distinction 
in order to enable a balancing of that norm against another allegedly competing 
human right or legitimate aim. It is contended that the non distinction norm was 
designed to shape the content of each human right internally so as to guarantee that 
human rights were ensured without distinction. The norm cannot therefore be used in 
an external balancing process. It is a part and foundation of each human right.  
It is submitted that the current judicial approach of balancing the non distinction norm 
against a human right or other legitimate aim fails to capture the true intent behind the 
norm. States, and the international community as a whole, have bound themselves to 
ensure all human rights through the prism of non distinction. The current 
conceptualisation of the non distinction norm does not accurately express the true 
extent of states' obligations in this area. Judicial bodies have a duty to act now to 
accurately redefine a state's obligations in respect to the non distinction norm. In 
particular, judicial bodies should start by accepting that a state's duty to ensure human 
rights without distinction is an integral part of the determination of the scope of each 
human right. For example, it would be disingenuous to frame a conflict between a 
                                                 
1  Charter of the United Nations, articles 1(3), 55 (c), 56. 
2  The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action specifically states that “respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms without distinction of any kind is a fundamental rule of 
international human rights law” UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 15. 
3  While there is a separate 'stand alone' equality right, as illustrated by article 26, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), this is a different legal concept from that of the 
fundamental duty to ensure human rights without distinction. This article will only be examining 
the duty on states to ensure human rights without distinction. 
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sexually discriminatory religious rule and gender equality as a conflict between the 
right to freedom of religion and gender equality. On application of the non distinction 
norm, it is clear that a practice, rule or law is only protected under the umbrella of a 
human right, if it is non discriminatory. The practice, rule or law would first have to 
pass the non distinction test before being accepted as falling within the remit of a 
human right. In this example therefore, the proponents of a sexually discriminatory 
religious rule would be unable to justify the discrimination by reference to their 
alleged right to freedom of religion. No balancing act would need to occur. The right 
to freedom of religion would not cover such a rule and as such, the relevant state 
would be under a duty to change the discriminatory rule to ensure a woman's equal 
enjoyment of her human rights. The non distinction norm is not a human right to be 
balanced alongside another human right but a fundamental norm that determines the 
content of all human rights and the parameters of accepted limitations to them. 
This paper revisits the textual basis of the fundamental duty on states to ensure human 
rights without distinction, using the ground of sex as a means of illustration4. It 
critically analyses and evaluates the way in which this duty has been judicially 
interpreted and developed by international and regional judicial bodies and proposes a 
re-examination of the current interpretative method of determining the scope of 
human rights and permissible limitations, in relation to non discrimination. It is 
argued that the primacy given to the non distinction norm in treaty law necessitates 
the development of a new interpretive method. Specifically, a ‘back to basics’ 
approach should be initiated which would resituate the non distinction norm, or in 
effect equality, at the heart of each human right in both theory and practice. This 
would mean the replacement of the current judicial balancing approach, in relation to 
non discrimination and equality, with a textually truer approach that uses the norm of 
non distinction to determine the content of each human right. This would, in effect, 
mean that a law, rule or practice must pass the non distinction test in order to come 
within the protection given by a human right or permitted limitation. The paper will 
then conclude by focusing on how this re-evaluation can be dealt with, adhered to, 
and promoted by international and regional judicial bodies. It is hoped that this re-
evaluation will thereby deny states, and segments of society, the ability to justify 
discrimination and deny substantive equality. 
2. Textual primacy of the non distinction norm 
The fact that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction 
on the enumerated grounds is a fundamental norm of international human rights law 
can be comprehensively proven by reference to the UN Charter, the main human 
rights treaties, World Conferences and related jurisprudence5. To summarise, the 
                                                 
4  The author has picked the non distinction ground of 'sex', in order to best illustrate her thoughts 
and theories in relation to the non distinction norm as a whole. The analogies and conclusions 
made in this article, in relation to sex, can easily be applied to any of the other non distinction 
grounds.  
5  ICCPR - Preamble, articles 2, 3, 4, 14, 23, 24 and 26, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Cultural and Social Rights (1966) (ICESCR) - articles 2, 3 and 7, African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1981) – articles 2, 3 and 18, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man (1948) – article 2, American Convention on Human Rights (1969) (ACHR) – articles 1, 17 
and 24, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1979) (Women 
Convention), International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
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promotion and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion is stated as being one of the purposes 
of the UN within articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter. Article 56 states that members 
have a duty to take joint and separate action, in cooperation with the UN, to achieve 
that purpose. There is therefore a direct obligation on states to ensure that everyone 
enjoys their human rights without distinction6. The International Court of Justice in its 
South West Africa Opinion7 was quite clear that 
“the enforcement of distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively 
based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin ……constitute 
a denial of fundamental human rights”8. 
They viewed the enforcement of distinctions etc, on the basis of race, as a 'flagrant 
violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations'9. While 
this opinion was given purely in relation to distinctions made on the basis of race, it is 
accepted that the court's conclusions on this matter are equally applicable in relation 
to all of the enumerated grounds10. 
The non distinction norm runs like a thread through the entirety of international 
human rights law with every human rights treaty and instrument containing an express 
admonition on states to ensure human rights without distinction. The wording of the 
duty changed over time, from ensuring 'without distinction' to 'without 
discrimination', but the purpose and the basic duty remained the same11. The reason 
for this change in terminology can be explained simply by noting that not all 
distinctions are discriminatory, some actually contribute to the attainment of 
substantive equality within a society. This point is demonstrated by the inclusion of 
                                                                                                                              
1966 (ICERD) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (CRC). Also 
see UN, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (A/CONF.157/23) (1993), UN, Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action (A/CONF.177/20) (1995), UN, Fourth World Conference on 
Women (A/CONF.177/20/Add.1) (1995) and UN Beijing plus 5 World Conference (A/S-
23/10/Rev.1) (2000). 
6  Human rights are considered to be an obligation erga omnes on every state. ICJ 5th February 1970, 
Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited Belgium v. Spain 
(New Application: 1962). 
7  ICJ 21st June 1971,The Legal Consequences For States Of The Continued Presence Of South 
Africa In Namibia (South-West Africa), Advisory Opinion, Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276. 
8  Id., para. 128-32. 
9  The court stated that '(I)t is undisputed that the official governmental policy pursued by South 
Africa in Namibia is to achieve a complete physical separation of races and ethnic groups. This 
means the enforcement of distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based 
on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights. This the Court views as a flagrant violation of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.' The Legal Consequences For States Of The 
Continued Presence Of South Africa In Namibia (South-West Africa) supra note 7, para. 128-32. 
10  This contention is supported by the fact that the International Court of Justice's wording in relation 
to a state's duty to ensure human rights without distinction was not only used as the basis for the 
definition of discrimination within the International Convention Eliminating Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), but also in the other non discrimination instruments, such as the 
Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
11  Whereas article 2, ICCPR talks about the rights recognised within that covenant being ensured 
without distinction, article 2(2), ICESCR talks about the exercise of rights without discrimination. 
After 1966, the basic duty became framed in terms of discrimination, as opposed to distinction. 
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articles promoting special temporary measures in non discrimination Instruments12. 
With the attainment of equality being the purpose behind the non distinction norm, the 
use of the wording 'non discrimination' is more illustrative of this aim than 'non 
distinction'. 
It is interesting to note that whilst the International Court of Justice interpreted and 
applied the duty of a state to ensure human rights without distinction, within their 
South West Africa case, the wording of their interpretation has been used as the basis 
for the definition of discrimination in the specific non discrimination treaties. This 
switch in terminology therefore came, to a large extent, out of and is evidenced by 
this extension and application of the International Court of Justice's interpretation of 
the duty of non distinction in treaty law. With the drafting and ratification of the 
various non discrimination Instruments came a shift of perception and a development 
of the duty not to discriminate into a more substantive positive duty to ensure 
equality. It can be seen that nowadays the non distinction duty laid upon states is not 
merely a passive one but a positive duty that entails a state fulfilling their duty of due 
diligence and ensuring, in practice, that each individual can enjoy their human rights 
on the basis of equality13. States therefore have an obligation to change not just 
negative laws, but a negative culture, including challenging any discriminatory 
religious, cultural or societal attitudes in the private, as well as, public sphere14.  
The duty on states to ensure human rights without distinction was given further 
impetus by the conclusions of recent World Conferences, which place gender 
equality15 at the centre of UN deliberations. This duty pervades the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action16, as well as the later Beijing and Beijing plus 
5 World Conference conclusions17, with the eradication of all forms of discrimination 
                                                 
12  For example, article 4, CEDAW. 
13  A state owes those within its jurisdiction, a duty of due diligence and must deter and prevent 
private actors from acting in a way that would negate another’s human rights. See Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 31, U.N. Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties 
to the Covenant CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 7 and Inter American Court, (21st July 
1989) Velasquez Rodrigues v Honduras, (Ser. C) No. 4 for more details. 
14  This can be illustrated by reference to article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) (African Protocol). This article 
places an obligation on states to ‘modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and 
men through public education, information, education and communication strategies …with a 
view to achieving the elimination of …practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men’. This obligation 
goes even further than article 5(a), Women’s Convention, by clearly specifying how states can 
fulfil their duty. Article 5(a), Women's Convention, does, however, have a wider number of state 
parties. See K. E. Mahoney, Canadian Approaches to Equality and Gender Equity in the Courts, 
in: R. J. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 437, 439 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), for more discussion on a state's duty to 
change a negative culture. 
15  The change in legal terminology from the use of ‘sex’ to ‘gender’ in relation to women’s equality 
marks a difference in the way that that roles are allocated. ‘Gender’ refers to the socially 
constructed roles of men and women that are given to them on the basis of their sex. ‘Sex’ refers 
to physical and biological characteristics of men and women. For more discussion on this, please 
see C. A. Brautigam, International Human Rights Law: The Relevance of Gender, in: W. 
Benedek, E. M. Kisaakye and G. Oberleitner (eds), Human Rights of Women, International 
Instruments and African Experiences 3 (London: Zed Books Limited, 2002) 
16  The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5. 
17  Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, supra note 5. 
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on grounds of sex and the full enjoyment by women of their human rights being stated 
as a priority objective of the international community18. 
The combined reach of these treaties and instruments mean that the overwhelming 
majority of states today have a legal and moral obligation to ensure equality in a 
woman's enjoyment of her human rights, as well as a connected but separate duty to 
ensure substantive gender equality19. The term 'non distinction norm' will be used 
throughout this article as shorthand for a state's current obligation to ensure human 
rights on the basis of equality. It is necessary to distinguish, at this point, between the 
duty to ensure human rights on the basis of equality and the duty to ensure substantive 
equality in relation to all of a woman's rights. While the duty to ensure human rights 
on the basis of equality contributes to substantive gender equality, it is merely a 
subsection of this wider and more encompassing duty. This article will only be 
discussing the context and interpretation of the more limited duty to ensure human 
rights on the basis of equality. It is hoped, however, that the progression of a new 
interpretative method in relation to this limited duty will play its part in contributing 
to the attainment of substantive gender equality. 
2.1. The current non discrimination test 
The duty on the states to ensure human rights without distinction is a stark and simple 
one. In none of the multiple references to it is there any mention of an allowable 
limitation to that right. It is a general legal interpretative principle that a right may not 
be limited otherwise than is provided for within its constituent document. Article 5, 
ICCPR, expressly incorporates this principle into the terms of the Covenant, explicitly 
prohibiting the protection of acts aimed at destroying or limiting any of the rights set 
out in the ICCPR and disallowing any reading in or extension of a limitation not 
specifically stated. As there are no limitations stated as being applicable to the non 
distinction norm, specifically set out in the ICCPR, article 5 does not allow any to be 
read into it. While this interpretative principle may not be expressly stated within 
some human rights treaties, it is asserted that it is equally, implicitly, applicable. In 
contrast, and as corroboration, it can be seen that where the international community 
has seen that it may be necessary, or is acceptable, to limit the application of a human 
right, they have explicitly allowed for this within that human right's constituent text. 
This can be illustrated by reference to the right to freedom of religion or belief. 
Article 18 (3), ICCPR, provides that the 
“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or 
moral or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 
The state parties therefore accepted, within the text of this negotiated covenant, that 
while certain rights may be limited, each human right must be ensured categorically 
without distinction. This stance can also be clearly seen in other human rights 
                                                 
18  Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 5, para. 36, 23. 
19  It can be argued that all states have a legal obligation to ensure gender equality due to the 
development of a customary international law norm of gender equality. For more details, please 
see D. Cassel and J. Guzman, The Law and the Reality of Discrimination Against Women, in: K. 
Astin and D. Koenig (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law, Vol.1, 287 
(Transnational Publishers, US, 1999). 
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Instruments and demonstrated by reference to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 
Although article 29 of the Universal Declaration provides for the limitation of one's 
rights and freedoms by reference to the rights and freedoms of another and other 
societal interests20, article 2 distinguishes between 'rights and freedoms' and the non 
distinction norm. It is quite clear that Article 29(2) applies purely to human rights and 
does not in any way allow for a limitation to the non distinction norm. This assertion 
is given additional strength by article 29(3), which specifically states that the rights 
and freedoms referred to in the Declaration cannot be exercised contrary to the 
purposes of the UN. As ensuring human rights without distinction is a purpose of the 
UN, this sub section compounds the fact that any limitation to the non distinction 
norm is invalid. Further, where the wording of a piece of legislation is clear and 
unambiguous, it is an accepted interpretative rule that a court must simply give effect 
to that wording without any judicial interpretation or tampering. It is asserted that the 
wording of the various human rights Instruments clearly and unambiguously shows 
that the duty on states to ensure human rights without discrimination has no 
limitations; consequently no limitation to that duty should be created by the judiciary. 
This contention gathers further authority from the fact that, not only are there no 
allowable limitations to the non distinction norm, there are also no derogations or 
reservations permitted. Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does 
not explicitly disallow reservations to be made which would compromise the non 
distinction norm, it does prohibit reservations that are incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the relevant treaty21. It is submitted that ensuring the rights in question 
without distinction is an inherent part of the object and purpose of each human rights 
treaty. Therefore, reservations which would have the effect of compromising the non 
distinction rule are impermissible. Additionally, each derogation clause, within a 
human rights treaty, specifically states that any derogation measures taken ‘must not 
be inconsistent with their other obligations under international law’ and ‘not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of sex’22. 
3. Judicial handling of the non distinction norm 
It is quite clear, therefore, that the non distinction norm has no textual limitation and 
was not designed to be overridden by societal, cultural or religious claims, even if 
those claims are framed as falling within the remit of a human right. A different 
stance has however evolved in legal practice. The interpretative texts and case law of 
human rights bodies and domestic courts have developed in such a way as to allow for 
certain limitations. Indeed, a general rule has emerged from the European Court of 
                                                 
20  The reference to the 'rights and freedoms' of others within the Universal Declaration can be seen, 
through a thorough reading of the Declaration, simply to mean those rights we refer to as 'human 
rights' today. 
21  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 19(3) (1969). 
22  For example Article 4, ICCPR states: “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination 
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin” 
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Human Rights' (European Court) jurisprudence that a distinction or differentiation of 
treatment will not be viewed as discrimination provided the criterion for such 
differentiation is reasonable and objective23. Therefore, the extent to which human 
rights are ensured to all equally currently depends on how the ‘objective and 
reasonable justification’ test is applied and what is actually viewed as an objective 
and reasonable justification by states and judicial bodies. 
3.1. International Jurisprudence on Non Discrimination on the Basis of Sex 
As set out above, not every distinction is viewed as discriminatory. A distinction is 
only discriminatory when there is no objective and reasonable justification for it. The 
scope of the concept of equality therefore depends on how the ‘objective and 
reasonable justification’ criterion is applied and what actually is viewed as an 
objective and reasonable justification. The Human Rights Committee has looked at 
the question of limitations to the non discrimination principle in a number of cases. It 
has however, yet to definitively set the parameters of its ‘reasonable and objective 
justification’ criterion, or to spell out its reasons for finding a violation or non 
violation of the non discrimination principle in any detail. It is therefore difficult to 
see how it would react to a state's use of the allowable limitations to a human right to 
justify discrimination in the application of that human right24. An analysis of its past 
decisions in relation to the use of the reasonable and objective justification test does, 
however, provide some basis for conjecture. 
In S. W. M. Broeks v. The Netherlands25 the Human Rights Committee considered 
that the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act differentiated on the basis of sex and 
placed married women at a disadvantage compared with married men. The Act 
automatically assumed a man was the ‘breadwinner’ but demanded proof from a 
woman on this account. The committee decided that such a differentiation was 
unreasonable and thereby breached article 26, ICCPR. In this case it was, however, 
accepted by the state that the present societal attitude within the Netherlands did not 
support the view that the man was automatically the ‘breadwinner’ within a 
relationship and therefore the societal attitude the Act was based on was outdated. 
This unfortunately meant that the committee did not directly address the point of 
whether a differentiation based on a ‘prevailing societal attitude’ could be legally 
deemed a ‘reasonable and objective’ justification. 
While it continued to evade answering this question in the other Dutch social security 
cases26, the Human Rights Committee did give some indication of its view in Dietmar 
                                                 
23  ECtHR 9th February 1967, Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in 
education in Belgium v. Belgium, Application nos. 1474/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 
2126/64 (1968), para. 10. 
24  Such allowable limitations, in relation to gender, are generally coached in terms of a 'prevailing 
societal attitude'. A term that is dangerous in the fact that use and acceptance of it appears to 
legitimise the favouring of status quo discriminatory attitudes over gender equality. 
25  HRC 9th April 1987,  S. W. M. Broeks v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 196 (1990). 
26  HRC 7th April 1994 Mrs. J.A.M.B.-R. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 477/1991, U.N. 
Doc. CPR/C/50/D/477/1991 (1994) and HRC 15th July 1994, H. J .Pepels v. The Netherlands, 
Communication No. 484/1991, U.N. Doc. CPR/C/51/D/484/1991 (1994). 
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Pauger v Austria27. Although it did not go into any detail on the reasoning behind its 
finding of discrimination in this case, it could be argued that by noting the fact that 
Austrian family law had, from 1976, imposed equal rights and duties on both spouses 
in its decision, the committee implicitly rejected the idea that the Austrian authorities 
could use a ‘societal attitude’ justification to defend a legislative distinction between 
the sexes28. This rejection was not, however, based on the fact that such a justification 
could never be valid but simply that the Austrian society was deemed to have 
accepted sexual equality within the home, in light of its prevailing family law. 
Though, in the above judgment, the Human Rights Committee does appear to be 
signalling that it will look behind and question a state’s assessment of its people’s 
societal values where there is evidence put forward suggesting a contrary view. 
The Human Rights Committee’s judgement in the Dietmar Pauger case is 
encouraging. It appears that the Human Rights Committee would not simply accept a 
state’s claims to be representing the societal view of their people at face value. We 
can also derive from its attitude in General Comment 28, that prevailing religious or 
cultural attitudes within a state would not be sufficient per se to override the precept 
of gender equality29. The ‘prevailing social attitudes’ justification does, however, still 
provide some pause for thought. Where it can be proven that the state's assessment of 
the majority of its people's societal attitude is correct, it would seem that this attitude 
might be accepted as a valid justification for a discriminatory practice. 
It can be seen from a cursory look at the reservations to the Women's Convention that 
states constantly refer to the fact that they have a religious society to justify 
distinctions made solely on the basis of sex30. It can also be quite clearly seen from 
                                                 
27  HRC 30th April 1999, Dietmar Pauger v Austria,Communication No 716/1996, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/65/D/716/1996 (1999). 
28  M. Nowak, The Prohibition of Gender-specific Discrimination under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, W. Benedek, E. M. Kisaakye and G. Oberleitner (eds), Human 
Rights of Women: International Instruments and African Experiences 105, 112 (London: Zed 
Books Limited, 2002) 
29  HRC, General Comment 28, Equality of rights between men and women (article 3), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000), para. 13. 
30  As the object and purpose of the Women’s Convention is the practical implementation of 
women’s equality, no reservations should have been made that were incompatible with this 
purpose. Unfortunately many reservations, especially to the fundamental article 2 and 16 of the 
convention, were phrased in terms excluding the operation of those articles insofar as they conflict 
with Shari’a law or a state’s personal/family law code. These can quite plainly be seen as contrary 
to the object and purpose of the Convention. In fact, the Committee has gone further and stated 
that as article 2 and article 16 are central to the object and purpose of the convention any 
reservation to these articles incompatible with article 28(2) should be withdrawn. For example, 
Egypt reserved its position on article 16, Women's Convention to ensure that Shari’a law would 
prevail over the Women’s Convention in relation to marriage and family relations, thereby 
preserving the current inequities of Egypt’s domestic Shari’a law. Egypt explained that its 
reservation was made “out of respect for the sacrosanct nature of the firm religious beliefs which 
govern marital relations in Egypt and which may not be called in question and in view of the fact 
that one of the most important bases of these relations is an equivalency of rights and duties so as 
to ….guarantee(s) true equality between the spouses”. 
By this reservation, Egypt was asserting that religious beliefs could override and justify 
discrimination against women as defined by the Women’s Convention, while simultaneously 
attempting to infer that while Shari’a law did not accord women and men identical treatment, it 
promoted true equality by a different route. For examples on how Shari’a law discriminates 
against women, please see S. Sardar Ali, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International 
Law:Equal Before Allah, Unequal Before Man? (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000); 
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the Cairo Declaration that states believe gender equality to be secondary to religion31. 
If a state had sufficient evidence to show that it was representing the prevailing social 
attitude of its people and that they valued a religious practice, which was prima facie 
gender discriminatory, it is difficult to say with any conviction that the Human Rights 
Committee would reject such a justification, made by the state, out of hand. As we 
can see from its case law, the European Court has allowed states to use a ‘prevailing 
social attitude’ justification to avoid a claim of non discrimination. This is obviously a 
dangerous premise and one that directly violates the non distinction norm, when used 
in relation to the enjoyment of human rights. 
3.2. Regional Jurisprudence on Non Discrimination on the Basis of Sex 
From its initial judgment on this matter, where it established the 'objective and 
reasonable' justification test32, to the present day the European Court has clearly 
considered the 'prevailing societal attitudes' in deciding the outcome of the reasonable 
and objective justification test in relation to discrimination issues. As seen from its 
case law, the European Court gives states wide latitude in determining and weighing 
up the views of society and is reluctant to question a state’s decisions in this matter33. 
In fact, only in a few cases has the European Court questioned34 or rejected a state’s 
legitimate aims35. Instead, the court prefers to make a finding of discrimination on the 
grounds that the measures taken by a state are disproportionate to the aim 
concerned36. 
The European Court also allows states a certain margin of appreciation in deciding 
whether the measure taken is proportional or not to their stated legitimate aim. The 
state therefore gains a second bite at the cherry. The court gives the state latitude in 
deciding whether there is a societal attitude and again in relation to the proportionality 
                                                                                                                              
M. Afkhami (ed.), Faith and Freedom. Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World (London: 
Tauris Publishers, 1995). 
31  The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam was adopted by the Nineteenth Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers in August 1990 to ‘serve as a general guidance for Member 
States in the field of human rights’. It blatantly places all rights an individual has within the 
framework of and subject to Shari’a law. The non discrimination and equal rights of women are 
specifically stated as being subject to Shari’a. To the extent that there is any clash between 
women’s equality and Shari’a law, Shari’a law will automatically be applied. This stance is 
directly at odds with the legal obligations that member states have undertaken under various 
international treaties and is illustrative of the attempt by certain states to redefine and in effect 
negate their obligations to ensure gender equality. 
32  The European Court established this test in the Belgian Linguistics Case - Relating to certain 
aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium v. Belgium, supra note 23, 
para. 10. 
33  The European Court feels that, ‘by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital 
forces of their countries, the national authorities are in principle better placed than an International 
Court to evaluate local needs and conditions’ ECtHR 26th February 2002, Frette v France, 
Application no. 36515/97, (2002), para. 41. 
34  ECtHR 28th May 1985 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. UK, Application nos. 9214/80, 
9473/81 and 9474/81, (1985); ECtHR 27th September 1999,, Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. UK, 
Applications nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96, (1999). 
35  ECtHR 29th June 2006, Zeman v. Austria, Application no 23960/02 (2006). 
36  ECtHR 13th December 2001, Case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia And Others v. Moldova, 
Application no. 45701/99, (2001). In this case, although the European Court criticised all of 
Moldova’s legitimate aims, it still held that the measure was discriminatory because of a lack of 
proportionality. 
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of the measure used to protect such a societal attitude. The European Court clarified 
the margin of appreciation given to states in relation to discrimination within Frette v 
France37, where it held that 
“Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and 
to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment 
in law. The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the 
circumstances, the subject matter and the background; in this respect, one of the 
relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of common ground between the 
laws of the Contracting States”38 
The European Court found in this case that  
“since the delicate issues raised in the case, therefore, touch on areas where there is 
little common ground amongst the member States of the Council of Europe and, 
generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage, a wide margin of 
appreciation must be left to the authorities of each State”39 
This stance of the European Court is unfortunate as most issues that impact on 
women’s equality, or any of the enumerated grounds, tend to be classified as 
‘delicate’ issues, where societal attitudes and the law in a state are in transition. The 
duty to ensure human rights without distinction is not, however, a progressive right, it 
is an immediate one. The non distinction norm was intended to prompt and ensure 
societal change towards substantive equality. The lack of change within a society 
should not, therefore, be an allowable justification for the non implementation of the 
non distinction norm. The doctrine of personal bar must surely operate. As stated in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, domestic law cannot be used as an 
excuse for the non implementation of a state's international obligations.40 
The European Court reiterated its 'transitional state of the law' approach in Petrovic v 
Austria41 where it acted as a qualification to the dictum that  
“the advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member 
States of the Council of Europe and very weighty reasons would be needed for such a 
difference in treatment to be regarded as compatible with the Convention”42 
The European Court found in this case that, at the material time, there was no 
common European standard regarding parental leave allowances to be paid to fathers. 
In making this determination, it considered the fact that  
“only as society has gradually moved towards a more equal sharing between men and 
women of responsibilities for the bringing up of their children, have the Contracting 
States introduced measures extending to fathers, like entitlement to parental leave”43. 
Taking this into consideration the European Court allowed the Austrian legislature a 
certain amount of leeway, finding that its gradual introduction of legislation on the 
issue reflected the evolution of society in that sphere, and accordingly the difference 
                                                 
37  Frette v France, supra note 33 
38  Id., para. 40. 
39  Id., para. 41. 
40  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 27 (1969). 
41  ECtHR 27th March 1998, Petrovic v. Austria, Application no. 20458/92 (1998). 
42  Id., para. 37. 
43  Id., para. 40-41. 
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in treatment was found not to be discriminatory44. It was indisputable that in this case 
there was a distinction based purely on sex. The European Court did not apply its own 
test in this case, to examine whether the authorities had an objective and reasonable 
justification and, specifically, ‘weighty reasons’ for the difference in treatment, a 
point picked up in the dissenting opinion of Judges Bernhardt and Spielmann. Their 
dissenting opinion pointed out that there were no weighty reasons in this case to 
justify a distinction on the ground of sex. They explained that 
“(I)t is in reality the traditional distribution of family responsibilities between 
mothers and fathers that gave rise to the Austrian legislation under which only 
mothers were entitled to parental leave allowance. The discrimination against fathers 
perpetuates this traditional distribution of roles and can also have negative 
consequences for the mother….. It is correct that States are under no obligation to 
pay any parental leave allowance, but if they do so, traditional practices and roles in 
family life alone do not justify a difference in treatment of men and women”.45 
This is the approach that the European Court arguably took in the later case of 
Wessels-Bergervoet v. The Netherlands46. In this case, the Dutch authorities put 
forward a similar argument to the Austrians but the court implicitly rejected this as a 
valid justification by finding relevant the fact that, at the material time, the 
Convention and Protocol 1 had come into force in the Netherlands. This is similar to 
the Human Rights Committee’s reasoning in Dietmar Pauger v Austria47, as set out 
above. The European Court, however, expressly avoided rejecting the social attitude 
justification by finding that in 1989, when the effects in question occurred, societal 
attitudes had changed and no longer supported this view. It has almost interpreted the 
duty to ensure human rights without discrimination as a progressive as opposed to an 
immediate right. 
Given the fact that the current societal attitude within Council of Europe member 
states supports the equality of women, it is difficult to see how this ground could now 
be used to justify a distinction based on sex. Sexual discrimination is insidious, 
however, and as such lies beneath many ‘neutral’ attitudes. It would not, therefore, be 
surprising if the ‘prevailing societal attitude‘ justification continued to be used by 
states and accepted by the European Court as a valid limitation to a woman's equal 
enjoyment of her human rights. 
The Inter American Court of Human Rights (Inter American Court) sees the notion of 
equality as springing directly from the oneness of the human family and being linked 
to the essential dignity of the individual48. As a result of this view it believes that ‘not 
all differences in legal treatment are discriminatory, for not all differences in 
treatment are in themselves offensive to human dignity’49. It has referred to and 
                                                 
44  The European Court took a similar approach in the recent case of Stec and others v. UK, 
Application no. 65731/01 (2006). In this case the Court found no violation of the Convention, as it 
considered that the respondent State’s decisions as to the precise timing and means of putting right 
the inequality in pension age did not exceed the wide margin of appreciation allowed in such a 
field. 
45  Petrovic v. Austria, supra note 41, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bernhardt and Spielmann. 
46  ECtHR 4th June 2002, Wessels-Bergervoet v. The Netherlands, Application no. 34462/97 (2002). 
47  Dietmar Pauger v Austria, supra note 27. 
48  IACtHR 19th January 1984, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the 
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), para. 55. 
49  Id., para. 56. 
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accepted the European Court’s test that a difference in treatment is only 
discriminatory when it has no objective and reasonable justification, as corroboration 
of this view50. In the Inter American Court’s view, distinctions will be justified if they 
achieve justice or protect those in a weak legal position.51 
Using the notion of the essential oneness and dignity of the human family as the 
starting point of equality, the court has emphasised that ‘it is possible to identify 
circumstances in which considerations of public welfare may justify departures to a 
greater or lesser degree’ from the standards outlined above. This ‘considerations of 
public welfare’ limitation has the potential to be used in the same way as the 
European Court’s ‘prevailing social attitude’ justification. Like the European Court, 
the Inter American Court has accepted that the balancing of different values and rights 
is difficult and is a process where contextual factors are important. It has therefore 
allowed states a certain margin of appreciation in such a process52. This means that 
the court may allow religious, cultural or societal claims to limit substantive equality 
but it is difficult to tell without any case law on the subject. 
While no case relating to discrimination has been adjudicated on by the Inter 
American Court, the Inter American Commission on Human Rights (the Inter 
American Commission) has, however, made a few decisions in this area. In María 
Eugenia Morales De Sierra v. Guatemala53, the commission followed the Inter 
American Court’s view and the European stance and applied the ‘objective and 
reasonable justification’ criterion54. It held that distinctions based on sex should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny and ‘very weighty reasons would have to be put forward to 
justify a distinction based solely on the ground of sex’55. The Guatemalan legislation 
in question provided that only a husband might legally represent family interests. A 
wife’s duty was to take care of the home and children, and her right to work was 
conditional upon her husband’s consent. The state defended these provisions as 
necessary for certainty and juridical security, the need to protect the marital home and 
children, respect for traditional Guatemalan values, and the need to protect women in 
their capacity as wives and mothers. The Inter American Commission felt that the 
statutory provisions did not actually accord with its stated aims and looked to the 
actual effect of the Civil Code, which denied married women legal autonomy56. It 
therefore decided that the distinction was discriminatory and violated article 24, 
ACHR. The Inter American Commission further held, in respect of article 17, that the 
provisions  
“far from ensuring the “equality of rights and adequate balancing of responsibilities” 
within marriage …institutionalize imbalances in the rights and duties of the 
spouses…The fact that the law vests a series of legal capacities exclusively in the 
husband establishes a situation of de jure dependency for the wife and creates an 
insurmountable disequilibrium in the spousal authority within the marriage. 
Moreover, the dispositions of the Civil Code apply stereotyped notions of the roles of 
                                                 
50  Ibid. 
51  Id., para. 57. 
52  Id., para. 58. 
53  IACommHR 9th January 2001, María Eugenia Morales De Sierra v. Guatemala, Report no. 4/01, 
Case 11.625 (2001). 
54  Id., para. 31. 
55  Id., para. 36. 
56  Id., para. 38. 
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women and men which perpetuate de facto discrimination against women in the 
family sphere, and which have the further effect of impeding the ability of men to fully 
develop their roles within the marriage and family.57” 
The Inter American Commission found the Guatemalan law violated article 17, read 
with reference to the requirements of Article 16(1) of the Women’s Convention. The 
above case illustrates a blatant case of gender discrimination, however, the Inter 
American Commission’s readiness to question whether these legal measures actually 
met their stated aims, by looking at their effects and taking provisions of the 
Women’s Convention into account, is encouraging. It suggests that the Inter 
American Commission takes a holistic view of non-discrimination and would not 
merely take cultural, societal or religious claims at face value but subject them to 
rigorous scrutiny based on the definition of equality within the Women’s Convention. 
Given that laws and societal practices that distinguish by sex usually have little 
rational justification in today’s world and generally breach the definition within the 
Women’s Convention, such an approach would usually result in the rejection of such 
laws and practices58. 
It could be argued that the reasonable and objective justification test evolved not to 
limit but to ensure substantive equality, the aim behind the non distinction norm; the 
test is simply a method by which corrective or ‘affirmative’ action can be taken to 
remedy systematic or historical discrimination59. While the application of the test in 
such a way would be in line with legislative intent and applauded, sadly it is used to 
limit as opposed to enhance substantive equality in practice. The objective and 
reasonable justification test used in relation to non discrimination has in fact 
developed to mirror the test judicial bodies use to determine the acceptable limits 
placed on substantive human rights. This is a blinkered and erroneous approach. They 
have treated the non distinction norm as if it were a human right as opposed to a 
defining principle. Indeed, they have not just treated the non distinction norm as a 
human right but analogous to a derogable human right, which clashes with the 
purpose and wording of each human rights instrument60. In their application of the 
objective and reasonable test, judicial bodies have not merely allowed distinctions that 
fulfil the greater purpose of equality to be exempt from being classified as 
‘discriminatory’; they have allowed limitations for much less vaunted reasons. The 
                                                 
57  Id., para. 44. 
58  It should be noted, however, that the decisions of the Inter American Commission are not legally 
binding and may be appealed to the Inter American Court. If the Inter American Court takes a 
more conservative view then the commission’s approach in the above case may be rejected. 
59  The preamble of the Twelfth Protocol (2000) to the ECHR, states that “the principle of non-
discrimination does not prevent States Parties from taking measures in order to promote full and 
effective equality, provided that there is an objective and reasonable justification for those 
measures”. This would lead one to believe that only measures which were designed to promote 
full and effective equality would not breach the ban against discrimination. 
60  It is curious that although commentators will argue that the non distinction norm must be balanced 
alongside another human right, the same stance is not taken in relation to the non derogable 
prohibition against torture. No limitation to this human right is, rightly, ever able to be legally 
justified. Part of the reasoning why there are no limitations allowed is precisely because none are 
admitted in the text and also because the prohibition is seen to be a fundamental principle of 
international law. Exactly the same arguments can be put forward in relation to the non distinction 
norm. 
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test has been used as a Trojan horse eroding the non distinction norm from within; it 
has allowed barriers to be erected on the road to equality. 
The introduction of limitations into the test for non discrimination provides a bar to 
the realisation of substantive equality. Due to the fact that the non distinction norm is 
a purely derivative right, which operates in relation to a substantive human right, if 
limitations are allowed to that human right, the non distinction norm can, in reality, be 
limited. To explain further, using the European human rights system as an example, 
the European Court considers an alleged article 14 violation alongside the alleged 
violation of a substantive human right. It usually looks at the alleged violation of a 
substantive human right and analyses whether there has been an interference/ non 
fulfilment of that right on the basis of one of the discrimination grounds. The 
difficulty lies in the fact that some human rights can be limited by reference to public 
order, health or morals, the rights and freedoms of others etc61. Where an individual 
alleges that they have been discriminated against in relation to such a human right, the 
European Court considers whether the prima facie discriminatory interference can be 
justified by reference to the accepted limitations to that human right. The respondent 
state therefore has the opportunity to justify the interference on the grounds that they 
had a legitimate aim and 'protected' that legitimate aim proportionally. By allowing 
such justification, the European Court is in reality, importing limitations into the non 
distinction norm. The court is not asking whether everyone's enjoyment of that human 
right can and should be limited by reference to a pressing societal need but whether a 
certain segment of that society's rights can be. While it may be acceptable to limit the 
whole of a society's human right, the non distinction norm was created to prevent the 
discriminatory application of such limitations, in relation to the enumerated grounds. 
The limitations to a substantive human right were not intended to, nor should they, 
limit the application of the non distinction norm. Judicial bodies need to distinguish 
between the two distinct tests. The determination that a state has discriminated against 
an individual on an enumerated ground is separate from the question of whether a 
limitation to a human right is allowable. There is no justification allowed for a 
distinction that does not contribute to substantive equality. This means that although 
the limitations section of a human right can be referred to, it can only be implemented 
if the relevant interference would affect everyone's potential enjoyment of that human 
right equally. If the effect of the interference is discriminatory then the limitation 
section is not applicable and the non distinction norm comes into play. The non 
distinction norm has no limitation; lack of equal enjoyment of a human right cannot, 
therefore, be justified, particularly not in relation to religious, cultural or societal 
considerations62. 
The problem with the current judicial 'objective and reasonable justification' approach 
lies in the fact that a state can justify discrimination of certain 'limitable' human rights 
by reference to national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights 
and freedoms of others63. Discriminatory traditional, cultural and religious views can 
                                                 
61  For examples of these kinds of clauses, please see articles 8, 9 and 10 ECHR. 
62  Indeed, the Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 28, explicitly states that “States 
parties should ensure that …religious …attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s 
right to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all Covenant rights” Human Rights 
Committee, supra note 29, para. 5. 
63  These justifications are taken from the limitation section, article 12(3), ICCPR, as an example of 
the general accepted limitations to certain specified human rights. 
15 
 
and do underlie such justifications, as illustrated in the case law set out above. States 
that feel that their interests are better served by protecting or promoting the interests 
of a certain segment of their society than by ensuring gender equality, will 
discriminate against women. This can be demonstrated by reference to the 
controversy surrounding the outcome of the Shah Bano case. In this case the Indian 
Supreme Court held that Muslim women could have recourse to the national criminal 
procedure where the Muslim personal law was insufficient. The ruling was seen to 
give primacy to the national criminal code as opposed to the Muslim Personal Law on 
a matter that was ostensibly a ‘family’ issue. In the furore following the Indian 
Supreme Court’s judgment, Rajiv Gandi, the Indian Prime Minister at that time, 
sympathised with the stance of women’s groups advocating women’s equality, but 
confronted with electoral defeat he submitted to the bullying of the All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board. He made it plain that unless the women could stop the rioting 
and violence on the street, religious sentiments would have to be appeased at the 
expense of women’s equality64. This is a blatant case of gender equality being 
sacrificed for the appeasement of a vocal minority. No individual petition was brought 
on this matter, so the Indian state did not have to defend its actions on the basis of the 
rights and freedoms of others, social morals, public order etc. If this had gone before a 
regional or international human rights body, it is debateable whether a justification on 
these grounds would have been accepted as a legitimate aim protected proportionality. 
It depends to what extent that judicial body would be willing to probe behind the 
stated legitimate aim and see whether discriminatory attitudes are in reality behind it. 
This is a tricky task for a judicial body, and one they are generally reluctant to fulfil. 
This reluctance can be illustrated, and perhaps explained, by the European Court's 
stance. It feels that  
“by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries, the national authorities are in principle better placed than an International 
Court to evaluate local needs and conditions”65 
While this sentiment may be true, it does not, however, negate the need to determine 
whether, regardless of the fact that the majority, or a certain segment, of a state holds 
certain views, those views are based on a discriminatory attitude. 
Usually the impact of discriminatory traditional, religious or cultural views is more 
subtle and at the root of a 'neutral' aim, thereby being more difficult to identify and 
question. While a state can frame the aim behind a discriminatory law in 'neutral' 
terms such as a child's best interests, as seen in Hoffman v. Austria66, it is obvious 
that, once the layers are peeled back, the real reason is a discrimination stereotype or 
traditional attitude. Although religious, cultural and traditional attitudes are often, if 
not always, at the heart of a state's true reason for allowing a discriminatory practice, 
judicial bodies do not tend to subject a state's legitimate aim to a piercing analysis or 
seek to lift the veil between the stated legitimate aim and the actual reason. In looking 
at a limitation to the enjoyment of an individual's human right, it is contended that 
judicial bodies should consider whether that limitation or interference disadvantages a 
                                                 
64  R. Coomaraswamy, To Bellow like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse of Rights, in: R. 
J. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women. National and International Perspectives 54 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 
65  Frette v France, supra note 33, para. 41. 
66  ECtHR 23rd June 1993, Hoffmann v. Austria, Application no. 12875/87 (1993). 
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certain gender or race. It is submitted, in relation to the reasonable and objective 
justification test, that judicial bodies must be ready to look behind a state's stated aim 
to the actual attitudes that lie beneath a certain law, rule or practice. The European 
Court has started down that road in relation to blatant discrimination on the basis of 
religion67 and sexual orientation68 but seems strangely reluctant to 'lift the veil' in 
relation to societal attitudes and stereotypes in relation to gender69. It is also 
somewhat interesting that the European Court places this 'lifting of the veil' into the 
second part of the objective and reasonable justification test, within the 
proportionality aspect, as opposed to the first, and on the surface more appropriate, 
part which deals with whether the state actually has a legitimate aim. It is this 
deference to a state's stated reason that is somewhat discouraging. 
The Inter American Commission has taken the more straightforward and transparent 
path and questioned whether a state's alleged legitimate aims are actually fulfilled by 
the practice in place. In María Eugenia Morales De Sierra v. Guatemala, they lifted 
the veil and determined that sexist stereotypes lay behind the impugned measure70. 
While the approach of the Inter American Commission is encouraging, it should be 
stressed that there should be no allowable justifications for a limitation to a human 
right that does not contribute to equality in the enjoyment of that right for all. The 
potential danger posed by the use of a limitation section justification, in relation to 
claims of non discrimination, lies in the reasoning behind it. The justification gives 
primacy to the status quo at the expense of an individual's human rights71. It could be 
utilised to support the so-called religious or cultural views of the majority of a group 
or the community at large within a state and prevent substantive equality. 
4. The Non Distinction Norm as a Method of Interpretation 
From looking at international and regional jurisprudence in this area, it can be seen 
that judicial bodies have de facto created limitations within the non distinction norm 
where, textually, there are no such limitations specifically permitted within any of the 
norm's encapsulations72. As stated earlier, where the constituent text of a right or 
principle does not allow for limitations, judicial bodies cannot create such limitations. 
In creating limitations, the judicial bodies have violated a cardinal rule of 
interpretation and the stipulations specifically set out in the relevant treaty texts. The 
‘reasonable and objective justification’ test has allowed the non distinction norm to be 
limited in a way neither envisioned nor sanctioned within the treaties and instruments 
espousing it. Its purpose of achieving equality has thereby been subverted. The whole 
legal approach towards the non distinction norm has to be re-thought. The 'reasonable 
and objective justification' test does not contribute to equality for all and therefore 
should be rejected as invalid. 
                                                 
67  Ibid. 
68  ECtHR 21st December 1999, Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, Application no. 33290/96, 
(1999). 
69  Petrovic v. Austria, supra note 41. 
70  María Eugenia Morales De Sierra v. Guatemala, supra note 53. 
71  As illustrated in the case of Petrovic v. Austria, supra note 41, where the European Court took the 
evolution of society into account in rejecting a sex discrimination claim. 
72  Supra 5. 
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It is contended that the non distinction norm is not a substantive human right but an 
overriding principle that determines the content of every human right. This can be 
verified by the wording ‘human rights without distinction’73. The non distinction 
norm is explicitly stated as a separate condition to be fulfilled within a state’s general 
obligation to ensure human rights. It is therefore not a value that can be balanced 
alongside an individual human right but a value that permeates every human right. 
This means that the content of each human right cannot be discriminatory. It may be 
acceptable to argue over the precise content of human rights but it is quite clear that 
regardless of the actual specifics, each human right must be ensured without 
distinction as to sex. While some human rights can be limited by reference to another 
human right, public order or moral consideration, the assertion of a human right or 
any other permitted limitation to a human right cannot legally be used to discriminate 
against women. No one can therefore assert that their human right would be violated 
if that human right, or another, was ensured to a woman on an equal basis.  
It is asserted that in order to fulfil the duty to ensure human rights without distinction, 
the content of each human right must not be discriminatory. This derives from the fact 
that if the content was discriminatory then another's enjoyment of that human right 
would be impaired and the non distinction norm violated. Following on from this 
reasoning, in order to ensure that the content of each human right is not 
discriminatory, all human rights should be interpreted in light of the non distinction 
norm. As the non distinction norm delineates the content of each human right, it is 
misleading to talk about there being a clash between the non distinction norm and a 
substantive human right as if they were human rights of equal weight. They are 
different entities. The non distinction norm does not fall within the category 'human 
rights'; it occupies a different dimension from a substantive human right. The outcome 
is not to be gained by weighing the two but by an interpretation of the human right in 
light of the non distinction norm. Just as the Vienna Declaration advocates 
mainstreaming gender equality throughout the UN system74, so should the concept of 
non distinction be mainstreamed through the interpretation of each human right. 
This view goes further than the balancing or 'practical concordance' approach mostly 
advocated in this book and other academics that treat the non distinction norm and a 
substantive human right as human rights, of equal weight, that should be balanced 
against each other75. For example, Sullivan talks of balancing the two ‘rights’, the 
substantive right to gender equality and the right to freedom of religion, taking 
account of the importance the particular practice being protected/interfered with has 
in relation to the relevant right, the degree of interference, other affected rights, the 
cumulative effect and the proportionality of the measure involved76. It is asserted, 
however, that recourse to a balancing act is premature; no human right protects 
attitudes or practices that disadvantage women in their effect. If such discriminatory 
claims are not sheltered underneath the umbrella of a human right or other accepted 
                                                 
73  This wording can be found in article 55 of the UN Charter, which states “ universal respect for …. 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to …. sex.” 
74  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5, para. 37. 
75  See A.E. Mayer, The Dilemmas of Islamic Identity, in: L. Rouner (ed.), Human Rights and The 
World’s Religions 94 (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) for a discussion on the idea 
of ‘a balance of harms’; D.J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Towards a 
Framework For Conflict Resolution, 24 International Law and Politic,796 (1992). 
76  D.J. Sullivan, supra note 75, 821. 
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limitation, then they cannot be used to prevent equality and check the assertion of 
another's human rights. If a woman therefore claimed that her right under article 23, 
ICCPR, was violated on account of her being unable to assert the same rights to 
divorce as her husband, the state's justification for that rule would first be subjected to 
the non distinction test. The state may well defend such a discriminatory rule by 
reference to the religious beliefs held by some in its society, couching its justification 
in terms of their right to freedom of religion and belief. However, if the state could 
not demonstrate that the rule contributed to, or at least did not detract from, overall 
gender equality in relation to a woman's article 23 rights, then no justification, 
regardless of how it was phrased, should be accepted by the relevant judicial body. 
Looking at this situation from a different angle, if the 'clash' was phrased in terms of 
an individual's right to freedom of religion being denied due to the assertion of 
another's article 23 right, firstly it would have to be considered whether the relevant 
practices did form part of an individual's right to freedom of religion. Those practises 
would have to pass the non distinction test before they could be considered as falling 
within the remit of article 18. If the practices were discriminatory then, there would be 
no article 18 right to assert. There would not, therefore, be a requirement to balance 
an article 23 right against an article 18 right in these circumstances. A balancing act 
between the two human rights would only be required where the religious rule, 
allegedly clashing with an article 23 right, did not de facto discriminate on the basis of 
sex. It must be borne in mind, however, that the rights within article 18 must also be 
assured to women on an equal basis to men.  
The 'balancing' approach is politically more palatable than the use of the non 
distinction norm as an aid for interpretation as it allows for subjectivity, cultural 
weighting and deference to religious, traditional or cultural values. This approach is 
not, however, supported by a textual interpretation of human rights treaties. As 
Howland points out ‘where the text provides standards and guidance for resolving 
conflicts, it is inappropriate to resort prematurely to the balancing approach’77. The 
text of the UN Charter and all subsequent human right treaties make it clear that the 
non distinction norm is an overriding principle which is applicable to all human 
rights. It is not merely the founding text of the non distinction norm that supports this 
view but a continued reiteration and affirmation that equality, and specifically gender 
equality, is a fundamental purpose of the various human rights systems78. The purpose 
behind the non distinction norm is clear; it is to ensure that everyone has an equal 
enjoyment of each human right. The non distinction norm only allows distinctions 
that can be demonstrated as contributing to substantive equality. 
When viewing human rights in the light of the gender element of the non distinction 
norm, the question that should be asked is ‘are these human rights ensured and 
respected without distinction as to sex?’ It is contended that, if it appears on the face 
of it or in practice that there is a distinction in relation to the fulfilment of a woman's 
human right, which does not contribute to substantive equality, the non distinction 
norm has been violated. The relevant 'discriminatory' measure/act should therefore be 
amended accordingly. This does not mean that exactly the same measures have to be 
                                                 
77  C.W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of 
Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter, 35 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 325 and 326 (1997). 
78  This has already been demonstrated earlier in this paper by use of the Vienna Declaration and 
other World Conferences and various political statements and resolutions etc. 
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applicable to both men and women, but simply that their potential enjoyment of a 
particular human right should be equal. If we view the non distinction norm in light of 
its purpose to ensure equality between men and women, it is obvious that this 
principle should be interpreted holistically. It is not enough that there is no direct 
discrimination or even any indirect discrimination; the question is whether there is 
substantive equality in relation to the enjoyment of human rights. The best way to 
determine this is to look at the actual effects of a certain measure or practice. 
The test that presently best determines this, is the one currently advocated by the 
Canadian courts in relation to s15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms79, 
which focuses on the impact of laws and the context of the individuals concerned80. 
The Canadian test determines discrimination in terms of disadvantage; if it can be 
shown that a distinction based on the personal characteristics of women continues or 
worsens the disadvantage suffered by them, then that distinction is discriminatory81. It 
looks further than merely distinctions that blatantly discriminate on the basis of sex, to 
ones that are actually discriminatory in their effects, taking context into account. The 
UK now uses a similar 'disadvantage' test in relation to sex discrimination in the field 
of employment82. It is disappointing however that both the Canadian and UK tests 
still allow the state to justify such a disadvantage83 and incorporate the use of a 
comparator84. It appears, therefore, that even though some states' domestic law is 
steadily working towards equality, a fundamental change in attitude is required before 
the concept of substantive equality is fully embraced. 
As argued by Howland, the way in which the duty to ensure human rights without 
distinction is phrased establishes that the distinctions themselves are of equal 
importance85. Following this rationale to its logical conclusion, this therefore means 
                                                 
79  S15(1) states that “every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability”. 
80  K.E. Mahoney, Canadian Approaches to Equality and Gender Equity in the Courts, in: R.J. Cook 
(ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 445 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
81  The Canadian Supreme Court in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
143, stated that discrimination was to be defined as ”a distinction, intentional or not, that is based 
on grounds relating to the personal characteristics of the individual or group concerned, and that 
has the effect of imposing disadvantages or burdens not imposed on others, or of withholding 
access to advantages or benefits available to others.” 
82  S 1(2)(b), Sex Discrimination Act 1975, declares that a provision, criterion or practice that applies 
or would apply equally to a man, which puts women at a particular disadvantage when compared 
with men, and that actually puts a woman at that disadvantage without it being a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim'. This test obviously incorporates a justification that would 
not be applicable in relation to the proposed non distinction test. 
83  In Canada, this is done by reference to art 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In 
the UK, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, as amended, allows for justification within s1 
(2)(b)(iii). In this section the test is whether the provision, criterion or practice apply equally to 
women and men but the provision, criterion or practice which puts women, and that particular 
woman, at a disadvantage as opposed to men is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim. 
84  This can be seen in the UK Sex Discrimination 1975, s 1(2) and in Canada within the cases 
following on from Supreme Court of Canada, 28th October 2004, Hodge v Canada (2004) SCC 
65. 
85  C.W. Howland, supra note 77, 331. 
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that the standard for evaluating whether there is a violation is the same for each 
distinction ground. This means that the non distinction norm discussed above is as 
applicable to distinctions on the grounds of race, religion or language, as it is to sex. 
The scope of each human right is therefore to be determined in relation to the non 
distinction norm on all its enumerated grounds. In this determination there is no need 
for a clash between the different non distinction grounds. The different grounds 
simply add to the whole and prevent discrimination in any of its guises, including 
multiple discrimination. For example: Plurality of religion does not itself impinge on 
women’s equality. While there is the potential for clashes between competing human 
rights, it is asserted that there is not the same potential for conflict between the 
enumerated grounds of the non distinction norm. 
5. The Proposed Legal Application of the Non Distinction Norm 
While it is relatively easy to discuss the need for and legal basis of the non distinction 
norm, it is trickier to determine how this principle should be interpreted in the 
international, regional and domestic law arenas. In the area of gender, rather than 
looking at the issue of ensuring human rights in relation to the equality of men and 
women, the legal approach, up until recently, has been to question whether one sex 
has been discriminated against by reference to the other. As Coomaraswamy argues, 
due to the difficulty in defining what is meant by the concept of equality, the law has 
taken the easy way out and used non discrimination, which can be factually 
ascertained, as its model86. This approach is beginning to change, as can be illustrated 
by the current usage of the 'disadvantage' test in Canadian and UK law. The allowance 
of limitations to the non distinction norm, through the justification element of the non 
discrimination criterion, has, however, remained unchanged. It is asserted that this 
element, more than any other, prevents the enjoyment by all of their human rights on 
an equal basis. 
Judicial bodies developed the reasonable and objective justification test to determine 
an allowable limitation to a substantive human right. However, this test crept into 
their determinations in relation to discrimination without, it is asserted, due legal 
analysis. They, like states, are comfortable with using the objective and reasonable 
justification to determine discrimination. The use of this test, alongside the margin of 
appreciation, gives states a certain leeway to ensure equality progressively. While this 
approach is understandable, it is incorrect and requires revising. International and 
regional human right bodies and domestic courts have a duty to enforce the 
implementation of states fundamental duty to ensure gender equality and human 
rights for all without distinction. In order to fulfil their duty, the judicial bodies should 
not allow any limitation to the non distinction norm. It is hoped that with the advent 
of an individual petition system in relation to the Women's Convention, the 
Committee to the Women's Convention will be proactive in the pursuit of gender 
equality and use the non distinction norm in the way proposed by this article87. 
                                                 
86  Supra note 54, p47. 
87  The Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention, 1999, which created the right of petition in 
relation to the Women's Convention, entered into force on 22 December 2000. It currently has 83 
state parties. The Committee to the Women' Convention has currently only published five petition 
decisions and has yet to decide on its approach in relation to gender equality and the so called 
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It can be argued that without being expressly conscious of it, the European Court has 
already been interpreting the scope of human rights by reference to the non distinction 
norm on the ground of religion. In relation to its jurisprudence on the right to freedom 
of religion and belief, it is clear that the European Court views the plurality of 
religion, as opposed to the actual manifestations of any religion, as the crucial 
element. The European Court has used the idea of plurality to determine what 
manifestations of religion should be protected by article 9, ECHR88. Indeed, it has 
almost interpreted article 9 as a non discrimination clause as opposed to a substantive 
rights clause. This can be clearly illustrated by reference to Sahin v Turkey89 where, 
although the court did place some boundaries on the ability of states to impose 
limitations on the right to freedom of religion, the boundaries it set were very loose, 
namely, that  
“'regulations must never entail a breach of the principle of pluralism, conflict with 
other rights enshrined in the Convention, or entirely negate the freedom to manifest 
one’s religion or belief”90. 
It seems therefore that only the absolute negation of a person’s right to manifest their 
religion is prohibited, a very weak protection indeed. The pre-eminence of plurality of 
religion and its almost necessary adjunct, secularism, can be seen running through not 
only the court’s entire case law on article 9 but also in its jurisprudence on other 
articles, notably article 1191. The European Court has used the idea of plurality of 
religion not only to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation to be given to 
states, but in determining whether an interference corresponds to a ‘pressing social 
need’ and is ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’92. In fact, the European 
Court has made it very clear that ‘a distinction based essentially on a difference in 
religion alone is not acceptable’93. This would accord with the new approach, asserted 
early, of not allowing a state to justify discrimination. It appears that the European 
Court is stricter in its application of the reasonable and objective justification test in 
relation to non discrimination on the basis of religion than it is in relation to sex. This 
approach accords with the primacy it gives to plurality of religion and secularism in 
the maintenance of democracy. Interestingly, it does not appear to view gender 
equality as a prerequisite to democracy. 
It is not too big a step for the European Court to move from its present stance on 
plurality of religion to actually explicitly interpreting the right to freedom of religion, 
or any other human right, in light of the non distinction norm on the ground of 
religion. If it is able to make that step then, on the basis that all distinctions within the 
                                                                                                                              
competing interests of 'other' human rights. You can read more about the Optional Protocol at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/text.htm, accessed on 27th November 2006. 
88  ECtHR 29th June 2004, Sahin v. Turkey, Application no. 44774/98 (2004), ECtHR 13th December 
2001, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, Application no. 45701/99, 
(2001), para. 145, ECtHR 26th September 1996, Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, Application 
No. 18748/91 (1996), para. 43-44, ECtHR 13th February 2003 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) 
and Others v. Turkey, Applications nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 (2003). 
89  Sahin v. Turkey, supra note 89. 
90  Id., para. 102. 
91  See Refah Partsi v. Turkey, supra note 89, para. 70, ECtHR 26th October 2000, Hasan and Chaush 
v. Bulgaria, Application no. 30985/96 (2000). 
92  Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia And Others v. Moldova, supra note 89, para. 119. 
93  Hoffmann v. Austria, supra note 66, para. 36. 
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non distinction principle are of equal status, the European Court should also interpret 
the content of a human right by reference to the gender non distinction norm. The 
High Court of Tanzania has already qualified customary practice in Tanzania by 
application of the human rights standard of non discrimination on the basis of sex94, 
while the Appeal Court in Botswana has done the same in relation to its national law 
in the case of Attorney General v. Unity Dow95. These cases demonstrate that where 
there is the requisite domestic political will to ensure equality, a way can be found to 
change the relevant discriminatory practice or view. Human rights bodies can increase 
such political will by publicly highlighting a state's discriminatory attitudes and not 
judicially supporting the continuation of discrimination through the application of an 
allowed justification. If domestic courts can qualify national law and customary law 
by the application of a state's non discrimination duty, then international and regional 
judicial bodies can apply the non distinction norm strictly, in the knowledge that such 
positive change is possible. 
As demonstrated above, it is possible for judicial bodies to determine the scope of a 
human right by reference to the non distinction norm. One of the easiest ways to do 
this is to change both the question and the starting point. It is asserted that judicial 
bodies should start from the premise of equality and, like the Canadian courts, ask 
whether the relevant rule or practice embodies a distinction based on the personal 
characteristics of women which continues or worsens the disadvantage suffered by 
them in relation to a human right. In line with starting from the premise of equality, as 
opposed to the status quo, these bodies could place the burden of proof on those 
defending a certain practice, where such practice appears to prima facie disadvantage 
women96. Those defending the 'discriminatory' practice could only argue that it did 
not continue or worsen a disadvantage suffered by women. If they could not prove 
beyond the balance of probability that it did not disadvantage women then such a 
practice would breach the non distinction rule, regardless of any so called 
justification. This would therefore mean that protection of the practice would not be 
accepted as a legitimate aim, capable of restricting the enjoyment of an individual's 
human right. If their domestic legal system was unwilling to follow this approach, the 
state could be held accountable for the breach of their international obligations in 
relation to the non distinction norm. 
While many will see this non distinction interpretative approach as a destruction or 
limitation of a particular human right and therefore untenable, it does not damage the 
essence of each human right. It instead brings states closer to realising their stated aim 
of ensuring human rights to all without distinction. Due to the current power balance 
in this world, human rights have been interpreted mainly by reference to masculine 
thoughts and needs. Interpreting human rights through the prism of the gender non 
distinction norm would merely allow a widening of the content of a human right to 
                                                 
94  Ephrahim v. Pastory and Kaingele 87 I.L.R. 106 (1990) as discussed in C. Beyani, Towards a 
More Effective Guarantee of Women’s Rights in the African Human Rights System, in: R.J. Cook 
(ed.), Human Rights of Women. National and International Perspectives 292 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
95  C.A. Civil Appeal No. 4/91 (Unreported), Id., 294. 
96  An example of where the UK courts already use this 'two prong' test in relation to the burden of 
proof is found in s63A, Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the case law surrounding this section 
e.g. UK Employment Appeal Tribunal 3rd April 2003, Barton v. Investec Henderson Croswaite 
Securities Ltd 2003 IRLR 332. 
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include women's thoughts and needs. All that would occur is that men's needs would 
no longer be allowed precedent over women's. Denying protection to those laws, rules 
and practices that are, in reality, sexist, only challenges patriarchal and unnecessary 
man made laws and practices that must be abolished to allow for the realisation of 
substantive equality. Whilst this may appear a simplistic and somewhat harsh 
approach, it should be borne in mind that the denial of protection for and an abolition 
of cultural, societal and religious practices that discriminate on the basis of race has 
been part of international law since the South West Africa opinion97. Whereas certain 
religions and cultures used to accept and even promote slavery and discrimination on 
the grounds of race, such religious and cultural doctrines have changed as social 
perceptions have and none, now, justify racial discrimination on the basis of religion 
and culture. It is therefore possible to invoke internal cultural change to support and 
ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights for both genders. Judicial bodies are 
under a duty to apply the relevant treaty and international customary law, with the UN 
bodies additionally bound by the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. The UN 
Charter and subsequent human right treaties make it clear that human rights are to be 
applied without distinction. The bodies should therefore allow no limitation to the non 
distinction norm and interpret each human right in light of it. 
6. Conclusion 
Within the main body of this article it has been submitted that judicial bodies should 
institute a 'back to basics' approach in their interpretation of states' obligations to 
ensure human rights without distinction. To that end, it revisited the textual basis of 
the non distinction norm and consequently asserted that the current 'balancing' 
between equality and a substantive human right or societal interest was incorrect and 
needed revising. Indeed, it was suggested that the non distinction norm is not a human 
right to be balanced alongside another human right but a rule by which the content of 
all human rights should be determined. It was therefore proposed that the judiciary 
develop a new interpretative method which would disallow justification for 
discrimination and actually ensure human rights to all, without distinction on the 
enumerated grounds.  
International, regional and domestic judicial bodies are gradually moving towards the 
position that traditional, cultural and religious justifications are insufficient per se to 
deflect a claim of gender discrimination. The reluctance of judicial bodies to 
specifically state that no limitation to gender equality, or any other equality ground, is 
permitted flows partly from their belief that the practices etc, that form the basis for 
such limitations, fall within the protection of a human right or permitted limitation to 
a human right. This reluctance can be countered by the application of a new 
interpretative approach whereby the content of each human right is determined by 
reference to the non distinction norm. Due to the fact that a discriminatory practice 
would not form part of any human right or allowable limitation, a practice that is 
discriminatory in its effect cannot be justified by reference to a limitations section. In 
the application of the gender non distinction norm it was suggested that the 
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(South-West Africa), supra note 7. 
24 
 
appropriate measure of whether a rule or practice was discriminatory was to look at 
whether it created or continued a disadvantage for women. 
The main obstacle to ensuring that human rights are enjoyed by all without distinction 
lies in the deference given to the views of the dominant or powerful within a state. 
Those in power wish to retain it and changing the structure of society to make it more 
equal can be perceived as a threat to their retention of power. Ultimately, all decisions 
of judicial and indeed political bodies are made whilst taking into consideration the 
consequences that their decision will have in relation to societal peace, the perceived 
internal legitimacy of their decision and the knowledge of how far they can ‘push’ 
those they rely on for support, without losing their power base98. While this 
contextual point is important to consider, it does not in any way negate the 
fundamental duty that a state has to ensure equality. It merely means that this change 
has to be managed in a sensitive manner. 
Although it is asserted that practical concordance is not applicable in relation to the 
non distinction norm, due to the lack of need for such a balancing act, there are some 
parallels that can be drawn between the refinement of this principle by Justice 
Tulkens and Professor De Schutter and the new interpretative stance advocated in this 
article. As the author understands it, their version of practical concordance relies upon 
the identification of the root causes of a so called clash of rights and the determination 
of whether there is indeed, or should be, such a clash. The use of the European case, 
Ollinger v Austria99, was seen to be illustrative of this revised version of practical 
concordance. Whilst delivering the joint paper100, Professor De Schutter used this 
case to demonstrate his point that states could and should be persuaded to transform 
society or use inventive strategies to prevent such a 'conflict' between rights from 
arising. In relation to the duty on states to ensure human rights without discrimination, 
it can be seen that although the struggle between the status quo of discriminatory 
attitudes and substantive equality is often framed as a clash between a human right or 
legitimate aim and equality, this is not legally correct. To restate a point made by 
Professor De Schutter, in relation to practical concordance, the state has an obligation 
to transform society to enable human rights to be ensured without distinction. The 
failure to fulfil such an obligation cannot be relied upon to create a semblance of a 
clash, where no clash, in law, should exist. In this sense we go back to the age old 
adage and legal rule that one is personally barred from relying on and benefiting from 
one's own failure to fulfil a legal obligation. It is quite clear from article 27, Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, that a state cannot justify a breach in its 
international obligations by virtue of an inconsistent internal law101. Surely this is 
even more relevant when we talk about culture, as opposed to law. For over sixty 
years states have had a fundamental legal obligation to ensure human rights without 
                                                 
98  See D. Feldman, Human Rights Treaties, Nation States, and Conflicting Moralities, 1, 
Contemporary Issues in Law 61 (1995). 
99  ECtHR 29 June 2006, Öllinger v. Austria. 
100  Justice Françoise Tulkens (European Court of Human Rights) and Prof. Olivier De Schutter 
(Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium) were invited to draft a paper for the International 
Conference: Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights hosted by Ghent University, Dec 2006. Prof. 
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101  Article 27 states that a “party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
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distinction. It has never been stated to be, nor is it, a progressive duty; on membership 
of the UN it became immediately incumbent on states to change their society to 
ensure human rights on the basis of equality, on the enumerated grounds. States 
cannot, therefore, use the fact that their society is not ready, after sixty years, to 
accept equality as a justification for continued discrimination. 
Although such a strict liability approach will invoke a negative reaction from states 
and those with power within a state, states have obliged themselves to ensure human 
rights on the basis of racial, gender, religious, etc. equality and must be brought to 
honour that pledge. Each state has a duty to ensure equality on the enumerated 
grounds throughout the whole of society. The fact that a discriminatory law or 
practice is labelled as traditional, cultural, religious, etc. does not change a state’s 
duty to eradicate it. A state’s duty goes beyond passing and enforcing laws to actually 
prohibiting discriminatory traditional cultural and religious laws, stereotypes, and 
practices. It must educate its people of the need for such change and persuade them of 
the benefits of equality. It is not enough that the state is convinced of the need for 
equality, the popular will has to be engaged for the societal change to ensure that 
human rights on an equal basis for all can become a reality. 
